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Abstract. This paper outlines the current problems of the different levels of Chinese administrative reforms 
implemented in the ¿ rst three decades from 1978–1979 to 2008–2009. The discipline of legal sinology is a 
relatively new scienti¿ c ¿ eld in Hungary and we have adopted its methods in the research leading to this study. 
The ¿ rst and second parts of the study are based on the grounds of the most modern historical sources on the 
antecedents of the reforms. The third part of this work analyses the reform of the State Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China. The most important result of this process was the recognition and protection of basic human 
rights under the State Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. The fourth part highlights recent 
administrative reforms from period to period. The administrative reform included the reform of the State Council 
(Government of the People’s Republic of China), as a result of which the number of the staff of the State Council 
diminished from 51,000 to 16,700. The ¿ nal part of this study introduces the reforms of Civil Law. In 1949, the 
Guomindang Laws (inclusive of the Civil Code) were suspended by Chinese Communists; therefore, putting the 
new Civil Code into force was urgently necessary. The Draft Civil Code was completed in 2004.
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the People’s Republic of China, amendments of the State Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 
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1. Preliminary Notes
One of the most intriguing phenomena in the contemporary world is the development 
implemented by the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter: PRC). That entails the 
requirement of a change in the conception of the tasks within legal sinology. However, 
Hungarian legal sinology including its scattered antecedents is being shaped in statu 
nascendi.1 Without the revealing analyses conducted in legal studies, administrative 
sciences, economics, political science and sociology the processes taking place in the most 
populated country of the world with the fourth largest territory cannot be understood. The 
undergoing progress in PRC raises questions like what position and role PRC will take 
with respect to emerging economies such as Brazil and India, what effects the growth of 
PRC will entail with respect to such signi¿ cant powers such as Russia or the European 
Union seeking its identity, furthermore, in what way the USA currently safely considering 
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1 As for the term of legal sinology, see Koi, Gy.: Jogi sinológia (Legal Sinology). In: Lamm, V. 
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revised edition.
349THE FIRST THREE DECADES...
itself to be the ¿ rst superpower of the world will be able to interfere with this process. The 
objectives of this study are to focus on the continual reforms of PRC taking place for the 
past 30 years with special regard to the legal and public administrative reforms and to 
allow insight into the results of economic reforms, as well. China has grown from an 
underdeveloped agricultural country into a superpower determining world processes, 
whereas, it has not changed concerning its spiritual roots (Maoism), although, its political 
system has become more compliant and it has accomplished outstanding economic and 
social achievements. These achievements bid fair prospects of high economic growth even 
during the world recession bringing the world to heel.2 It cannot be precluded that in view 
of the current processes unless their tendency changes, PRC may become the most 
signi¿ cant power of the world within a few decades. In parallel to these processes, the 
above-mentioned research in Hungarian legal sinology commenced and was perpetuated. 
Although, this was delayed in line with the recognition of the signi¿ cance and 
unnegligibility of PRC by the Hungarian political and economic elite after the change of 
regime, which did have consequences.3 
In what follows we will apply the method that ¿ rst we will introduce the annals history 
of Chinese reforms, while focusing on the major intersections, then, the processes of the 
constitutional reform, the  administrative (including  civil service) reform and ¿ nally, the 
reform of civil law will be elucidated.
2 See the video recording of the speech of Wen Jiabao, Prime Minister of PRC in Chinese at the 
Davos Annual Meeting 2009 of the Davos World Economic Forum at the following link:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rs9fqfvYiXw (last visited on 20.12.2009). At that time, in 
comparison with the GDP ¿ gure in 2008, an annual growth of 8% was predicted for 2009 with regard 
to the dif¿ culties. 
3 This is unambiguously highlighted by the following quotation from an authentic Hungarian 
sinologist: “By the mid-1990s, the circumstance that Hungary became the Central-Eastern-European 
centre of the distribution network of Chinese goods was a free gift of history. Despite the historical 
aspiration of Hungary to become the economic-¿ nancial hub of the region, we could not take 
advantage of this stroke of luck and practically, we did not even recognise this fact. It was only after a 
decade’s delay that Hungary attempted to transform into a Chinese bridge-head in the EU, when we 
had largely missed the opportunity under the changed circumstances. As for the current scope of 
action, the accommodation of the Chinese whole-traders enriched here as full members in Hungarian 
society could be accomplished, which could prevent their abandoning the country by withdrawing 
their wealth, as well.” We need to mention that the sinologist author had held this opinion before the 
public recognition of the moment (15 September 2008: Lehmann Brothers, the fourth largest 
commercial bank of the USA pleaded Chapter Eleven) of the process of the global ¿ nancial crisis 
proceeding from the subprime mortgage crisis and expanding into the world economic recession of 
2008–2009. It is also intriguing that all this supervened about 80 years after the Great Depression of 
1929–1933, thereby justifying economic cycle theories. Quotation from: Polonyi, P.: Gondolatok a 
magyarországi kínai kolóniáról (Thoughts about the Chinese Colony in Hungary). In: Polonyi, P.: 
Múlt a jövĘben. Írások Kínáról (Past in the Future. Essays on China). Budapest, 2007, 301. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the Yingke-Várnai Law Firm, that is, the ¿ rst legal enterprise expanding in 
Europe besides PRC opened in Hungary in mid-September 2010 can be acknowledged as a positive 
development. 
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2. The Antecedents and Commencement of the Reforms
The outset of the “Reform and Openness” policy (in Chinese: Zhongguo de gaigé kaifang) 
is disputed. The death of Mao Zedong (1893–1976) can be regarded as a major antecedent 
of evolution of the reform process, which struck the 82-year-old party leader on 9th 
September 1976 subsequently to protracted illness occurring after a heart attack.4 (Mao had 
been the number one leader of the Chinese Communist Party5 (in Chinese: Zhongguo 
Gongchan Dang) (hereinafter: CCP) for 41 years out of its history of 55 years at that time, 
being one of the handful founding members numbering 12 according to mistaken tradition, 
in fact, their number was 13).6 Several candidates were prepared to assume power after the 
death of the dictator including the notorious Gang of Four (in Chinese: Siren bang; in 
4 More amply, see Gernet, J.: Le Monde chinois. Gallimard, Paris, 1972, 502–503; Popov, A. P.: 
ɉɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɟ ɫɢɫɬɟɦɵ ɢ ɩɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɟ ɪɟɠɢɦɢ ɜ Ʉɢɬɚɟ XX ɜɟɤɚ (Political Systems and Political 
Regimes in China in the 20th Century). Ɇɨscow, 2007, 174–175.
5 Of¿ cially, the Party was established on 1 July 1921 by Chinese Marxists educated in the so-
called “Fourth of May Movement” under the inÀ uence of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. 
Initially, more signi¿ cant ¿ gures of the movement included Li Dazhao and Zhen Tuhsiu. Concerning 
the public and party history between 1949 and 1976 see Saich, T.: Governance and Politics of China. 
New York, 2004, 25–56.
6 In fact, 12 delegates represented 53 founding members; the former ones can be partially 
identi¿ ed by name in the Russian source-material: „Ʉɨɦɦɭɧɢɫɬɢɱɟɫɤɚɹ ɩɚɪɬɢɹ Ʉɢɬɚɹ ɛɵɥɚ 
ɨɫɧɨɜɚɧɚ ɜ 1921 ɝɨɞɭ ɜ ɤɚɱɟɫɬɜɟ ɤɪɭɠɤɚ ɟɞɢɧɨɦɵɲɥɟɧɧɢɤɨɜ. Ɉɮɢɰɢɚɥɶɧɨ ɩɚɪɬɢɹ ɜɟɞɟɬ ɨɬɱɟɬ 
ɫɜɨɟɣ ɢɫɬɨɪɢɢ ɫ I ɫɴɟɡɞɚ ɫɨɫɬɨɹɜɲɟɝɨɫɹ ɧɟɥɟɝɚɥɶɧɨ ɜ ɤɨɧɰɟ ɢɸɧɹ–ɧɚɱɚɥɟ ɢɸɥɹ 1921 ɝɨɞɚ ɜ 
ɒɚɧɯɚɟ. ɇɚ ɫɴɟɡɞɟ ɩɪɢɫɭɬɫɜɨɜɚɥɨ 53 ɱɟɥɨɜɟɤɚ, ɜ ɬɨɦ ɱɢɫɥɟ 12 ɞɟɥɟɝɚɬɨɜ. ɋɴɟɡɞ ɩɪɨɜɨɡɝɥɚɫɢɥ 
ɤɨɧɟɱɧɨɣ ɰɟɥɶɸ ɩɚɪɬɢɢ ɩɨɫɬɪɨɟɧɢɟ ɜ Ʉɢɬɚɟ ɫɨɰɢɚɥɢɡɦɚ. Ʉɥɸɱɟɜɭɸ ɪɨɥɶ ɜ ɫɴɟɡɞɟ ɢ ɫɨɡɞɚɧɢɢ 
ɩɚɪɬɢɢ ɫɵɝɪɚɥɢ Ʌɢ Ⱦɚɱɠɚɨ, ɑɷɧɶ Ⱦɭɫɸ, ɑɷɧɶ Ƚɭɧɛɨ, Ɍɚɧɶ ɉɢɧɲɚɧɶ, ɑɠɚɧ Ƚɨɬɚɨ, ɏɷ Ɇɷɧɫɸɧ, 
Ʌɨɭ ɑɠɚɧɥɭɧ ɢ Ⱦɷɧ ɑɠɭɧɫɹ. ɇɚ ɫɴɟɡɞɟ ɜ ɤɚɱɟɫɬɜɟ ɨɞɧɨɝɨ ɢɡ ɞɜɭɯ ɞɟɥɟɝɚɬɨɜ ɨɬ ɩɪɨɜɢɧɰɢɢ 
ɏɭɧɚɧɶ ɩɪɢɫɭɬɫɬɜɨɜɚɥ ɢ Ɇɚɨ ɐɡɷɞɭɧ. ɋɪɟɞɢ ɞɪɭɝɢɯ ɭɱɚɫɬɢɤɨɜ ɫɴɟɡɞɚ ɛɵɥɢ Ⱦɭɧ Ȼɢɭ, Ʌɢ 
ɏɚɧɶɰɡɸɧɶ, Ʌɢ Ⱦɚ, ɑɷɧ Ɍɚɧɶɰɸ, Ʌɸ ɀɷɧɶɰɡɢɧ, ɑɠɨɭ Ɏɨɛɚɣ, ɏɷ ɒɭɯɷɧ, Ⱦɷɧ ɗɧɶɦɢɧ, ɚ ɬɚɤɠɟ 
ɞɜɚ ɩɪɟɞɫɬɚɜɢɬɟɥɹ Ʉɨɦɢɧɬɟɪɧɚ.” “The Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921 as a group 
of associates. Of¿ cially, the party has kept records of its history since its Congress held illegally at the 
end of June and early July 1921 in Shanghai. The Congress was attended by 53 people including 12 
delegates. The Congress proclaimed the ultimate purpose of the Party: building socialism in China. 
The key roles in the Congress and the establishment of the Party were ful¿ lled by Li Dachrao, Chen 
Duxiu, Chen Gunbo, Tan Pingshan, Zhang Guodao, He Mensun, Lou Zhranlun and Deng Zhongsa. 
The Congress was attended by Mao Zedong as one of two delegates from Hunan Province. Other 
regional congressmen included Tung Biwu, Li Hanqun, Li Da, Chen Danxiu, Liu Renqing, Zhou 
Fobai, He Shuhen, Deng Yenmin as well as two representatives of the Comintern.”
See ɂɫɬɨɪɢɹ Ʉɨɦɦɭɧɢɫɬɢɱɟɫɤɨɣ ɩɚɪɬɢɢ Ʉɢɬɚɹ (History of the Chinese Communist Party) 
entry at http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/ɂɫɬɨɪɢɹ_Ʉɨɦɦɭɧɢɫɬɢɱɟɫɤɨɣ_ɩɚɪɬɢɢ_Ʉɢɬɚɹ (last viewing: 
1 January 2011).
According to the second source, seven communist groups included approximately 60 members 
and the number of the delegates was 13. The second source names the following delegates: Zhang 
Guodao, Liu Renqing (from Beijing); Li Hanqun, Li Da (from Shanghai); Tung Biwu, Chen Danxiu 
(from Wuhan); Mao Zedong, He Shuhen (from Changsha); Deng Yenmin, Wang Qinmei (from Xian); 
Chen Gunbo, Bao Huisheng (from Canton/Guangzhou); Zhou Fobai (from Tokyo). The key ¿ gures of 
the CCP-movement, Li Dazhao and Zhen Tuhsiu stayed away from the Congress. In the work of the 
Congress Mr. Maring (from the Comintern) and Mr. Nikolsky (from the Pro¿ ntern) participated, 
however, according to the second source, Nikolsky is a pseudonym. See Glunin, V. I. (ed.): A Kínai 
Kommunista Párt története 1921–1969 (History of the Chinese Communist Party 1921–1969). 
Budapest, 1974, 18, 601.
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Russian: Ȼɚɧɞɚ ɱɟɬɵɪɺɯ),7 however, Mao Zedong appointed his successor in his life,8 
scilicet, Hua Guofeng (1921–2008), who became the party leader and (formally) the 
President of the Central Military Commission, but he was never assigned to the latter 
position.9 During his rule, Hua took the advice of the more sober part (less supportive of the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution) of Chinese military leadership (still alive veteran 
generals). The “Gang of Four” was so reckless that they spread in the groves of the party 
about Hua that he was an uneducated rural cadre, whose promotion could be attributed to 
being a party secretary of the native village of Mao Zedong,10 where he had established a 
Mao Museum constituting a place of pilgrimage, therefore, he had risen through the ranks. 
Consequently, the military leadership, especially Marshall Je Jianying supporting Deng 
Xiaoping rapidly convinced Hua that the “Gang of Four” may induce a situation of civil 
war, therefore, they quoted the 1968 Party Decision of CCP, which stipulated expressly that 
a situation of civil war needed to be prevented by all means. Therefore, the “Gang of Four” 
was arrested on the night from 6th to 7th October 1976, which had been hastened by the 
news received from Shanghai (the nest of the gang) that the local people’s militia had been 
preparing the way for a takeover of power. By that time, however, the gang had itself 
understood the weakness of its position. By the time the trial of the “Gang of Four” was 
instituted (it lasted from November 1980 to January 1981),11 the 5th National People’s 
    7 Allegedly, the gang was designated by reason of their manifest power aspirations and 
intriguing disposition by Mao Zedong himself, who initially and partly supported the formation 
established as “The Sanghai Group”, which opposed primarily Zhou Enlait and Deng Xiaoping. The 
members of the group were extreme left cultural revolutionaries, otherwise four members of the 
Political Committee of CCP: Jiang Qing, who died at the age of 77 in 1991 (i.e. Mao’s fourth wife 
known as “Madame Mao” in the West); Zhang Chungqiao, Yao Wenyuan as full members of the 
Political Committee, ¿ nally, Wang Hongwen as a co-opted member of the Political Committee. Saich: 
op. cit. 54. sqq.
    8 This is justi¿ ed by written proof. The seriously ill dictator in his last days was practically 
unable to speak; therefore, he issued orders in writing. Presumably, the small scrap of paper (without 
an addressee) dates from May 1976, which in the unmistakably peculiar and hardly falsi¿ able 
handwriting of Mao reads as follows: “(On condition that) You manage matters, I’ll be reassured.” (in 
Chinese: Ni zou shih, wo fang xin). The photocopied version of the scrap of paper made the headlines 
of all Chinese newspapers on the day following Mao’s death. 
    9 Jordán, Gy.: Kína története (The History of China). Budapest, 1999, 388.
10 His homeland was Shaoshan in Hunan province. For more ample data about this administrative 
unit in English, see Shaoshan as a Wikipedia entry in English: http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Shaoshan (last visited: 20 December 2009).
11 During the trial, the Gang of Four and formerly arrested persons (ten military leaders) 
belonging to the group of the “Lin Biao conspirators”, furthermore, the personal assistant of Mao, 
Chen Boda (1904–1989) were indicted. Besides being the lawful revelation of the Cultural Revolution, 
the trial conducted by special judiciary was simultaneously a show trial broadcasted by the state 
television for two months, owing to which the principal defendants were convicted. Jiang set up the 
mere implementation of Mao’s orders as a defence. Nevertheless, the trial did not conclude in the 
strong condemnation of Mao’s activity, whereas, not only the accused but also the extraordinarily 
pestiferous and utterly meaningless Cultural Revolution was also condemned. As an outcome of the 
trial, the principal defendants were found guilty for the persecution of up to 730,000 people and the 
death of 35,000 people. Jiang Qing (Madame Mao) and Zhang Chungqiao were sentenced to death, 
but the execution of the sentence was suspended and in 1983 it was commuted to life imprisonment. 
The other accused were condemned to 16–18 years’ imprisonment. The “show” nature of the trial is 
unequivocally exposed by the following text: “In 1981, the four deposed leaders were subjected to a 
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Congress (Chinese Parliament) during its third session between 30th August and 10th 
September 1980 relieved Hua Guofeng of his of¿ ce as a Prime Minister (but he was only 
later dismissed from senior leadership during the Congress of CCP in September 1982), 
who was replaced by Zhao Ziyang (1919–2005) for the period of 1980–87. Policy-making 
became ¿ nally controlled by the genuine successor of Mao, the pragmatist Deng Xiaoping 
(1904–1997), who was appointed to be the third president of CCP (the position was not 
occupied between 1976 and 1978). 
Around December 1978, 18 Chinese peasants organised a secret night gathering with 
advance arrangements in the village of Xiaogang in Anhui province (in China, secret 
gatherings, religious associations, political societies and movements date back traditionally 
to ancient times). However, this one was a so-called formless gathering (in Latin: concio), 
where the participants agreed that they would withhold the product surplus and would not 
contribute it to the collective, whereas, they would carry on paying mandatory taxes and 
arising costs. Later, politicians approved of the matter posteriorly. There may have been 
other similar actions, at any rate, this went down in history and can be deemed to be 
the outset of the thirty years’ reforms. However, it apparently was not a conscious 
commencement, those who participated did not suspect what they were initiators of and the 
reforms would not have amounted to much unless politics traced back the beginnings to this 
event and the political historical events, which we will elucidate in the following.12 
A signi¿ cant antecedent consists in the “Ten Years’ National Economic Development 
Program” based on the experience of the economic boom of 1977 and designed for the 
years of 1976–1985, the basis of which had been elaborated already in 1974. The Program 
was adopted by the 2nd Plenary Session of the 10th Central Committee of CCP held between 
18–23 February.13 The 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of CCP (18–22 
December 1978) meant the “tensile test” on the one hand between the orthodox extreme left 
and the Maoist party workers promoting the Cultural Revolution aligned with Hua Guofeng, 
on the other hand, the centrist realist forces clustered around Deng Xiaoping considered 
right-wing (within the party). Some years later, this plenum was reasonably declared a 
milestone by writers of party-history, since this led to the evolution and consolidation of the 
“Reform and Openness” policy. At that time, the main slogan besides personal rehabilitations 
(which remarkably and massively rehabilitated a proportion of the politicians persecuted 
preceding the Maoist Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (in Chinese: Wúch΁njiƝjí 
Wénhuà Dàgémìng) was “socialist modernisation” and the “Ten Years’ National Economic 
Development Program” designed for the years of 1976–1985 by Hua was not even 
mentioned, whereas, it anticipated a demand for change. At the same time, the session 
bestowed great attention on the issues of the democratic rights of the masses, the freedom 
of criticism, the reinforcement and extension of democracy and the legal order, furthermore, 
on the restoration of legality. Following the polemical article of a social scientist, the issues 
“whether the only criterion of the establishment of truth is indeed a practice”,14 furthermore, 
show trial and convicted of anti-party activities”. See Gang of Four (Wikipedia entry in English) at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gang_of_Four (last visited: 20 December 2009). 
12 The policy of “Reform and Openess” is expounded in extensive Hungarian literature see 
Jordán, Gy.–Tálas, B.: Kína a modernizáció útján a XIX–XX. században (China on the way of 
modernisation in 19th and 20th century). Budapest, 2005, 255–348.
13 Jordán–Tálas: op. cit. 238. sqq.
14 This was raised in opposition to the following formula of Hua Guofeng published in Renmin 
Ribao on 7 February 1977: “Whatever President Mao’s decision could be, we will support it, whatever 
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“whether truth should be sought after starting from facts” were raised. The participants 
deemed it important that the people’s way of thinking should be liberated since: “If 
everybody in a party, in a country and within a nation acts verbatim, the way of thinking 
will harden, progress will become impossible, life and the party will come to an end and the 
country will decline”. At any rate, the imperishable merits of Mao Zedong were recorded 
with the comment that the demand that a revolutionary leader should be impeccable is not 
Marxist.15 
It is debated even in technical literature which year should be regarded as the ¿ rst year 
of the reforms. A Russian source in a renowned journal of legal studies points out that the 
initial year of the reforms was 1978.16 The article of a Chinese author written in English 
and published in a prestigious journal of public administration considers 1979 to be the 
initial year of the reforms.17 We deem it important to point out that the prevalence of the 
reform became practically manifest only by 1980 and its outset was only subsequently 
established. Therefore, it is very appropriate to mark the years of 1978–1979 as “a continual 
beginning”, which entailed amazing changes in the life of PRC.18 These processes are 
designated as Leninist Transitions by certain Western scholars19 (Although, in our view, the 
system of the Chinese Proletarian Dictatorship was rather peculiarly Chinese and later much 
more and expressly Maoist than Leninist. Instead of Leninist, Marxist–Leninist would have 
been the appropriate terminology according to the concepts of scienti¿ c socialism.)
guidance President Mao gave us, we will unwaveringly follow it”. This was the so-called formula of 
the “two whatevers” (in Chinese: liang ge fanshi), concerning which Deng Xiaoping declared in May 
1977 that it did not comply with Marxism. Concerning the formula see Jordán–Tálas: op. cit. 236. On 
the statement of Deng see Deng, X.: “Liang ge fanshi” bu fuhe makesizhuyi (The “two whatevers” 
does not meet the Marxism). In: Deng Xiaoping Xuanji (1975–1982) (Selected Works of Deng 
Xiaoping, 1975–1982). Beijing, 1983, 35–36. Quoted in Jordán–Tálas: op. cit. 237, footnote 2. On the 
assessment of Hua’s policy see Saich: op. cit. 55–56. 
15 On the quotation, see Zhongguo Jingji Nianjian (China Economic Yearbook). 1981, II/24.
16 Kumanin, E. V.: Ʉɢɬɚɣɫɤɨɟ ɩɪɚɜɨ ɜ ɭɫɥɨɜɢɚɯ ɪɟɮɨɪɦ (The Chinese Law from the 
perspective of the reform). ɋɨɜɟɬɫɤɨɟ ɝɨɫɭɞɚɪɫɬɜɨ ɢ ɩɪɚɜɨ, 61 (1988) 9, 91 sqq.
17 You, Ch.: Current Administrative Reform in China. International Review of Administrative 
Sciences, 52 (1986) 3, 123 sqq.
18 For example, it suf¿ ces to mention concerning city development that Shanghai with up to 17 
million permanent and 4 million temporary residents has become the ¿ nancial centre of the Far East, 
or we could refer to Shenzhen under Deng, formerly a ¿ shing village, then a megapolis has become 
part of the Special Economic Zone mainly because it borders on Hong Kong. In the recent two 
decades, 30 billion USD has À own into this city, which is currently the largest harbour of China and 
one of the most dynamically developing cities of the world. Today it has a population of approximately 
8,700,000. Within its population, the proportion of people under 30 is strikingly high, while 20%. of 
the Chinese Ph.D. holders live here. In 2011, Shenzhen accommodated the 26th Summer Sports 
Universiade. An important source concerning Shenzen: Má li Shenzhen. Glamourous Shenzhen. 
Shenzhen shi renmin zhenhfu xinwen hangong shi. Shenzhen, 2009, 24. (with a supplementary 
Chinese–English CD). 
19 Winckler, E. A.: Describing Leninist Transitions. In: Winckler, E. A. (ed.): Transition from 
Communism in China. Institutional and Comparative Analyses. Boulder (COL, US)–London, 1999, 
3–48; Winckler, E. A.: Explaining Leninist Transitions: In: Winckler, E. A. (ed.): Transition from 
Communism in China. Institutional and Comparative Analyses. Boulder (COL)–London, 1999, 259–
294.
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3. The Constitutional Reform 
Both the traditional Chinese legal system,20 scilicet, the imperial period of China (221 
B.C.–1911 A.D.) recognised and the legal systems of the Chinese Republic (1912–1949) as 
well as of the currently prevailing People’s Republic of China (since 1949) have incorporated 
the legal institution of a written constitution. The enumeration of the Chinese written 
constitutions is not an easy task.21 For a long period, France used to exist in such a 
constitutional uncertainty just as the People’s Republic of China did between 1954 and 
1982, when it had four written constitutions within a short period of 28 years (according to 
the sources: state constitutions), however, we need to mention that the state constitution of 
1982 (hereinafter: the Constitution) has been practically in force for so many years. The 
signi¿ cance of constitutional law in China (in Chinese: xianfa) is increasing. With regard to 
their longevity, we can claim that the Constitution is in compliance with the reforms. 
Therefore, we will expound the pre-history of the effective Constitution more amply. 
The draft of the Constitution was subjected to a four-months’ national debate on 28 
April 1982. Formerly, the National People’s Congress had appointed a Constitutional 
Review Committee of 100 members on 7 September 1980. Beng Chen, the Vice-President 
of the Constitutional Review Committee speci¿ ed the most important basic principles of 
20 See technical literature on the topic: Balazs, É.–Maspero, H.: Histoire et institutions de la 
Chine ancienne des origines au XIIe  siècle après Jésus-Christ. Paris, 1967, 303. passim. Bodde, D.–
Morris, C.: Law in Imperial China. Exempli¿ ed by 190 Qing Dynasty Cases. With Historical, Social, 
and Judicial Commentaries (Translated by the Xingan Huilan). Cambridge (MA), 1967. XIII, 615.
21 The constitutions are enumerated chronologically in the following works of English-language 
technical literature written by Chinese authors: Zhian, T.: The Government and Politics of China. 
Cambridge (Mass.), 1950, 435. Concerning constitutional history in the republican age see Chen, R.: 
Zhongguo xianfa shi (History of the Chinese Constitution). Shanghai, 1933; Kuhn, P. A.: Les origines 
de l’Etat chinois moderne. Paris, 1999, 205; McHenry, R. (ed.): Britannica Hungarica 
Világenciklopédia (Britannica Hungarica World Encyclopaedia).Vol. 10, Entry China. Budapest, 1998, 
483. Column 2: refers mistakenly to the ¿ rst Constitution of 1908 as a new constitution put in force 
by the Manchurian Court in 1906. Concerning the Constitution of 1946 see Peaslee, A. J. (ed.): 
Constitutions of Nations. Vol. I. From Afghanistan to Finland. The Hague, 2nd ed., 1956, 506–515. 
For the text of the constitution: ibid. 515–535. See the Constitution of 1946 in Taiwan: A Brief 
Introduction to the Republic of China. Taipei, 1998, 19. sqq. Concerning the Constitution of 1954 see 
Popov: op. cit. 197–202; Su, J.-H.–Tomson, E.: Regierung und Verwaltung der Volksrepublik China. 
Köln, 1972, 17–36, 70–113. According to our knowledge, the whole text of the Constitution of China 
of 1954 was published in Hungarian see Zhou, E.–Liu, S.–Mao, Z.: A Kínai Népköztársaság Országos 
Népi GyĦlésének I. ülésszaka 1954. szeptember 15–28. A Kínai Népköztársaság alkotmánya (The First 
Session of the National People’s Congress between 15–28 September 1954. The Constitution of the 
People’s Republic of China). Budapest, 1954. Concerning the constitution of 1975 see Popov: op. cit. 
202–203. Concerning the constitution of 1978 see Lesage, M.: Les institutions Chinoises. Paris, 1978, 
21; Popov: op. cit. 203–221. Concerning the (effective) Constitution of 1982 see Popov: op. cit. 221–
224; Jakóbiec, W.–Rowinski, J.: System konstytucyjny Chinskiej Republiki Ludowej (The Constitutional 
System of the People’s Republic of China). Warsaw, 2007, 98; Saich: op. cit. 123–124. and passim. 
Separate monographs expounding the subject: Lin F.: Constitutional Law in China. Hong-Kong–
Malaysia–Singapore, 2000, 378; Palmer, M.: The Chinese Constitution. A Contextual Analysis. 
Oxford, 2011 (publication in process).
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the future basic law: insistence on the four (basic) principles,22 the principal task of the 
Chinese people is to focus its efforts on socialist modernisation, the development of socialist 
morals is indispensable for material development, the basic rights of the citizens shall be 
safeguarded in compliance with socialist democracy and the socialist legal system, the 
system of people’s gatherings shall be reinforced and the scope of their power shall be 
extended, ethnic autonomy shall be developed, basic-level political power shall be reinforced 
etc. Special emphasis was placed on equality before the law, the protection of personal 
dignity, on the principle that no organisation or individual shall enjoy rights unless they are 
guaranteed under the constitution or separate law and on the requirement of the reinforcement 
of the socialist economic system. Finally, the constitution was adopted by the 5th Session of 
the National People’s Congress on 4 December 1982. At that moment, the constitution 
contained 138 Articles divided into 4 Chapters: I. General Principles, II. The Basic Rights 
and Obligations of the Citizens, III. The Organisation of the State, IV. The National Flag, 
the National Coat of Arms and the Capital. The Constitution as promulgated was published 
in Hungarian translation relatively soon, but it was not easily accessible.23 It is worthwhile 
to expand on the four major (comprehensive) constitutional amendments before engaging in 
the actual analysis.24
3.1. The First Amendment of 12 April 1988 
The new amendment of Art. 11 sets forth: “The state shall permit the existence and 
development of the private sector of the economy within the limitations prescribed by law. 
The private sector of the economy shall be complementary to socialist public economy. The 
state shall protect the lawful rights and interests of the private sector of the economy and 
shall exercise guidance, supervision and control over the private sector of the economy”.25 
Jordán claims that this amendment reinforces the legal status of the private sector so that 
22 We need to expand on the above-mentioned so-called four principles (Four Cardinal 
Principles, in French: quatre principes fondamentaux) contained under the Constitution. These are as 
follows:
í  The Principle of the Leadership of the Communist Party; in French: La reconnaissance du rôle 
dirigeant du Parti communiste chinois,
í  The Principle of the Guidance of Marxism–Leninism and Mao Zedong Thoughts; in French: Les 
instructions du marxisme–léninisme et des idées du Mao Zedong,
í  The Principle of the People’s Democratic Dictatorship; in French: L’attachement á la dictature 
démocratique populaire,
í  The Principle of Adherence to Socialism; in French: L’attachement á la voie socialiste.
See Lin: op. cit. 25–35. (points 2.06.–2.13.); Bányai, L.: Quelques problèmes de la modernisation du 
système politique de la République Populaire de Chine. In: Lukic, R. (ed.): La modernisation du 
droit. Beograd, 1990, 6.
23 MTI International Documents, 26 (1983) 3, 3–25. Currently, the Hungarian translation of the 
signi¿ cantly amended Constitution and its annotation are under publication. See the English-language 
version of the constitution: The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. Beijing, 1983. See 
further one of the Chinese text editions: Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Falu Fagui Quanshu, 1 (1994), 
20. sqq.
24 Popov: op. cit. 221. sqq. passim. Jakóbiec, W.–Rowinski, J.: op. cit. 34. Only the Polish 
source mentions the exact dates of the 3rd and 4th amendments. 
25 The earlier text was this: “No organisation or individual may appropiate, buy, sell, or lease 
land, or otherwise engage in the transfer of land by unlawful means.”
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the private sector shall function as a supplement to the state sector.26 Lin highlights the 
following amendment (Para. 4) of Art. 10: “No organisation or individual may appropriate, 
purchase, sell or otherwise engage in the transfer of the land by unlawful means. The right 
to the use of the land may be transferred according to law”. In the opinion of Lin, the 
recognition of the existence of the private enterprise and the private sector and the regulation 
of the transfer of the right of the use of land are of crucial importance. The amendments 
reveal that Chinese economy tends to be market-oriented and some socialist dogmas have 
been replaced by practical thinking.27 
3.2. The Second Amendment of 19–29 March 199328
The 1993 Amendment amounted to changes in the constitution at nine points (Lin). 
According to the technical literature at our disposal, it is only Jordán who outlines three 
highly signi¿ cant amendments of the preamble seeming inconsequential at ¿ rst sight. As 
Jordán formulates: “The amendment adopted on 19 March 1993 declared in compliance 
with the turning point supervening in economic policy in 1992 that China shall abide by 
market economy instead of planned economy, nevertheless, it also included other important 
supplements”. The requirement of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, which is 
basically applicable in nearly all respects, was incorporated in the section of the preamble 
stipulating the tasks of socialist modernisation. Mentioning Chinese characteristics, features 
or quality does not only refer to the consideration of the conditions and features of China 
upon seeking solutions, but this is also a manifestation of Chinese nationalism becoming 
more and more determinant. Other phrases of the amendment highlighted democracy and 
building a democratic socialist nation. This manifests itself in the following amendment: 
“The system of multi-party cooperation and political consultation led by the Chinese 
Communist Party shall prevail and develop in the distant future, as well”. The Preamble 
was also supplemented by a short af¿ rmative sentence: “China is at the primary stage of 
socialism”. The statement, which does not seem to be too consequential, had had a relatively 
long prehistory, but the conclusions and references deriving from it are even more important. 
The incorporation of the tenet into the constitution was actually delayed, since it was the 
theoretical conclusion of the 13th Congress of CCP at the end of October 1987 that China 
was at the primary stage of socialism and this feature would mark at least the next 100 
years as of the 1950s. The tenet secured a relatively wide scope of action to government as 
26 Jordán: „Az ég magas, a császár messze van.” Igazságszolgáltatás, jog, és politika Kínában 
(“The Skies Are High, the Emperor is Far Away.” Jurisdiction, Law and Politics in China). Budapest, 
2008, 208.
27 “They are concerned with the economic system and with the intention to legitimise the 
prevalence of private enterprise and the transfer of land-use rights. These amendments have 
demonstrated that Chinese economy is more market-oriented and that some of the socialist dogmas 
have given way to pragmatism.” Lin: op. cit. 17. (Point 1.23.). The Polish publication on the 
amendment of 1988 is in accordance with the other two sources with respect to private enterprise: “W 
nowelizacji z 1988 roku uznano sektor prywatny za uzuplenienie gospodarki opartej na systemie 
wlasnosci publicznej (Art. 11).” In English: “In Amendment of 1988, the private sector was a 
complementary economy-based system of public ownership (Art. 11)”. Jakóbiec–Rowinski: ibid.
28 19 March 1993 is mentioned: Jordán: „Az ég magas …” op. cit. 208; 29 March 1993 is 
speci¿ ed as the date of the amendment: Jakóbiec–Rowinski: ibid. The contradiction currently cannot 
be dissolved in a reassuring manner, since the other sources at our disposal ignore the speci¿ cation of 
dates.
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for its basic economic and political reform steps and their ideological acceptance. This 
could be quoted upon the widespread permission of private enterprise and the private sector, 
upon the application of other forms of distribution (pro¿ t, dividend etc.) besides distribution 
according to “socialist” work, upon taking over certain capitalist methods (instead of the 
former total contraposition of capitalism and socialism) and upon the justi¿ cation of the 
admission of foreign operating capital funds and other forms of cooperation (Jordán). Our 
Polish source highlights terms in re the supplementary law of 1993 such as the “Reform 
and Openness” [policy] (in Chinese: gaigé kaifang; in Polish: reformy i otwarcie), socialism 
with Chinese characteristics (in Chinese: you Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi; in Polish: 
socjalizm o chinskiej specy¿ ce). 
Under Art. 7, issues concerning the state sector of the economy are regulated. Here, 
instead of “expansion” of the sector, the word “development” is used, since the reform 
entailed dwindling and massive shrinking of the economy supervised by the state (Jordán). 
Under Art. 8, the rural commune having dissolved a decade before (at the beginning of 
the 1980s) was replaced by the system of rural contractual liability. Jordán restricts himself 
to the assessment of the amendments under Arts 15 and 17, whereas, the Polish volume 
expands on the amendment of Art. 16, as well. Under Arts 15 and 17, the term of planned 
economy and those pertaining to state planning were deleted. Art. 15 regulates issues related 
to the public sector of the economy. The new version uses the expression “strengthening” 
instead of the former “growth” in connection with economic sector. The reform in this case 
means diminishing planned economy (economy supervised by the state).29
Under Art. 16, rural communes dissolved at the beginning of the 1980s were replaced 
by the system of rural contractual liability. 
Our Polish source outlines the amendments pursuant to Art. 16.30 From Arts 15 and 17, 
the terms of “planned economy” and “state planning” were deleted.
Paragraph 3 of Art. 42 was amended, as well. The term of “state enterprise” was 
changed to “state-owned enterprise”.31
As Art. 98 stipulated: “The term of mandates at the people’s congresses at the regional 
level shall be ¿ ve years”. Whereas, the term of mandates at the lowest level of people’s 
29 Article 15: The state shall accomplish socialist market economy. The state shall strengthen 
economic legislation and improve macro-economic supervision. State laws shall prohibit disturbance 
of the social-economic order by any person. 
30 Article 16: State-owned enterprises shall accomplish management by themselves within the 
limitations prescribed by law. State-owned enterprises shall implement democratic management via 
congresses of workers’ representatives and in other ways in accordance with the law.
Article 17: Collective economic associations shall conduct economic activities independently 
and have decision-making powers in compliance with relevant laws. Collective economic associations 
shall implement democratic management and assign or recall the members of management as well as 
decide on major issues of organisation management in accordance with the law. In the territory of 
China, foreign companies and other foreign economic associations such as Chinese-foreign joint 
ventures shall observe the laws of the People’s Republic of China. The lawful rights and interests of 
joint ventures shall be protected by the laws of the People’s Republic of China.
31 Article 42: Work shall be a matter of honour for every citizen who is able to work. All the 
people working in state-owned enterprises as well as in urban or rural economic collectives shall 
relate to their work as masters of the country they are citizens of. The state shall promote socialist 
labour emulation as well as shall commend and reward exemplary and outstanding workers. The state 
shall encourage citizens to take part in voluntary labour. 
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congresses remained three years.32 In case of the people’s congresses of counties and 
administrative units of the same level, the term was raised to ¿ ve years, just as the term of 
the mandates at people’s congresses of the provinces and at the People’s National Congress, 
scilicet, Chinese Parliament lasted.33 Lin does not expand on the amendment in detail, 
although, he mentions that it was conceived in the spirit of the socialism with Chinese 
characteristics and market economy. The 1993 Amendment demonstrated that CCP was 
genuinely following the way of lawful procedure.34
3.3. The Third Amendment of 15 March 1999
According to Lin, six amendments were made, out of these, Jordán and our Polish source 
mentions four ones. It was the 15th Congress of CCP that made a decision on the 
amendments. They included “the theory” of “the eternal pragmatist”, Deng Xiaoping among 
the basic principles under Section 7 of the Preamble besides the concepts of Mao Zedong. 
The basic principle of the rule of law (in Polish: rzady prawa or praworzadnosc)35 was 
incorporated under Para. 1 of Art. 5 as an eloquent proof that China shows due regard not 
only for continental law, but also for Anglo-Saxon law. Three amendments concerned the 
transition to the Chinese-type market economy, whereby the private sector was declared to 
be an important and equal component of market economy instead of being a supplementary 
component of socialist economy. On such grounds, the dominance of distribution according 
to labour under Art. 6 was quali¿ ed, since it shall co-exist with other methods of distribution. 
Article 11 regulates the above-mentioned reinforcement of private enterprise, accordingly, 
the original phrase “The private enterprise of municipal and rural workers, which shall 
operate within the limitations of law, shall be a supplement to the publicly-owned socialist 
enterprise” was replaced by what follows: “The individual, private and other not publicly-
owned enterprise, which shall exist within the limitations of law, shall be major components 
of socialist market economy”. Furthermore, it also anticipated the protection of the state for 
both the individual and the private enterprises.36 In accordance with the amendment of the 
Chinese Criminal Code, the reference to counter-revolutionary crime was deleted from Art. 
28, instead, the phrase of crime threatening national security has been introduced.37 
3.4. The Fourth Amendment of 14 March 2004
Zhiang Zemin’s ideology of the Three Represents’ (in Chinese: SƗngè Dàibi΁o; in Polish: 
trzech reprezentacji) was adopted in the Preamble of the amended Constitution. This 
ideology legalised the possibility of party membership for most capitalists. The reason was 
as follows: “The party should represent progressive productive forces, as well” (this is 
32 The lowest levels refer to the people’s congresses of townships, ethnic townships and towns.
33 On the Amendment of 1993, see Lin, op. cit. 18. (Point 1.23a.); 87. (Point 4.14.). Jakóbiec–
Rowinski: op. cit. 35.
34 On the Amendment of 1993, see Lin: op. cit. 18. (Point 1.23a.); 87. (Point 4.14.). Jakóbiec–
Rowinski: op. cit. 35.
35 The rule of law and the Rechtsstaat are not the same concepts. The Rechtsstaat is a typical 
concept of continental law (speci¿ cally, of German law). It can be translated into English as the “legal 
state” or the “state of law”, but it cannot be referred to as the “rule of law” in English texts.
36 Jordán: „Az ég magas …” op. cit.; Jakóbiec–Rowinski: op. cit. 36–37.
37 Lin: op. cit. 18. (Point 1.23a.), 364–365. See English version of the Third Amendment, Art. 
16 as amended.
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antagonistically contrary to the principle of class struggle of Maoism). The provision of Art. 
10 was supplemented as follows: “[…] the legally obtained private property of citizens 
shall not be violated”. Article 11 promotes the most powerful protection of market economy. 
Article 13 protects more accentually the right of citizens to inherit private property. Article 
14 supports building the social security system. Paragraph 1 of Art. 33 contains a new 
sentence of historical value: “The state shall respect and protect human rights”. Under Art. 
67, the new expression of “state of emergency” appears in line with the former one of “state 
of war”. This new concept modi¿ ed the roles of the President of PRC and the State Council 
(Arts 80, 89). Article 98 extends the term of mandate in all the lowest level (local) people’s 
congresses to ¿ ve years.38 Article 136 stipulated that the Chinese national anthem shall be 
March of the Volunteers (in Chinese: Yìy΅ngjǌn Jìnxíngq·; in Polish: Marsz ochotników); 
the reason for this af¿ rmation was the lack of reference to Mao Zedong.39 In the following, 
we will analyse two important subject-matters of The State Constitution of PRC.
3.5. (Self-) De¿ nition of the People’s Republic of China (Art. 1) 
According to this section, the People’s Republic of China shall be governed by the working 
class, which amounts to a socialist state of the people’s democratic dictatorship (dictatorship 
of the proletariat40), the foundation of which has been laid by the alliance of workers and 
peasants. It is highlighted that the socialist system is the foundational state establishment, 
which allows for no departure. The ¿ nal sentence refers to the destruction of the socialist 
system, which is prohibited both in re-natural persons (humans) and associations (unity of 
persons and capital either incorporated or not, scilicet, legal entities and other organisations 
without legal entity). The text does not point it out, nevertheless, it can be presumed that the 
prohibition of destruction41 refers merely to the ordinary meaning of destruction, not to the 
criminal legal sense of the term as a fact of the case under criminal law in Hungary 
pertaining to treason. PRC shall be a single-party state.
3.6. The basic rights and duties of citizens under Arts 33–56 
With respect to PRC, the issue of basic human rights is of major importance. The 
Constitution provides basic human rights and duties under the same chapter, which is 
dogmatically appropriate. However, we need to clear up a misunderstanding, scilicet, that it 
was revealed upon the translation of the UN Charter that the term of right does not have an 
equivalent in Chinese. The equivalent of the term of substantive law (in Latin: ius, norma 
agendi; in English: law) is falü. Indeed, the term of civic rights (in Latin: facultas agendi; 
in English: right) did not use to have an ingrained equivalent, which could substantiate the 
divergent construction of human rights (besides a different conception of power). 
38 Jakóbiec–Rowinski: op. cit.; Jordán: Kína története. op. cit. 209–210.
39 Jakóbiec–Rowinski: op. cit. 37; Jordán: ibid. 210.
40 This is a typical concept of Karl Marx (in German Diktatur des Proletariats) in Fourth 
Chapter of Critique of the Gotha Program (in German Kritik des Gothaer Programms) from 1875.
41 Article 1: The People’s Republic of China is a socialist state under the people’s democratic 
dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. The socialist 
system is the basic system of the People’s Republic of China. Disruption of the socialist system by 
any organisation or individual is prohibited.
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Nevertheless, these do not amount to the fact that the term of human rights does not have an 
equivalent in contemporary Chinese, since it means rénquán.42
The Constitution specifi es the following rights:
í The right to citizenship (Art. 33),
í Equality before the law (Art. 33),
í The right to vote and the right to be elected (Art. 34),
í The citizens of PRC enjoy freedom of speech, the freedoms of the press and of 
assembly, the freedoms of organisation, procession and demonstration (Art. 35),
í The freedom of religion (Art. 36),
í Citizenship rights (Art. 37),
í The right to human dignity (Art. 38),
í Inviolability of the residence of citizens (Art. 39),
í The freedom and privacy of correspondence (Art. 40),
í The right to criticism and making suggestions (Art. 41),
í The right to petition (Art. 41),
í Citizens who have suffered losses via the infringement of their civic rights by any 
state organ or functionary have the right to compensation in accordance with the law 
(Art. 41),
í The right to work (Art. 42),
í The right to rest (Art. 43),
í The right to retirement (Art. 44),
í The right to material assistance for elderly, ill and disabled persons (Art. 45),
í The right to education (Art. 46),
í Freedom to engage in scienti¿ c research, literary and artistic creation and other 
cultural pursuits (Art. 47),
í Women’s rights (Art. 48).
The Constitution specifi es the following duties:
í Every citizen shall enjoy the rights and comply with the duties prescribed under the 
Constitution and other law (Art. 33),
í The state shall respect and protect human rights (Art. 33),
í The insult, libel, false accusation or false incrimination directed against citizens by 
any means shall be prohibited (Art. 38),
í The duty of work (Art. 42),
í The duty of education (Arts. 45–46), 
í Compliance with the “one child policy”, or in of¿ cial terms with family planning 
(Arts 25, 49, 107),43
í Parents shall comply with the duty to raise and educate their minor children and 
grown-up children shall comply with the duty to support and assist their parents (Art. 49),
í Violation of the freedom of marriage shall be prohibited, as well as maltreatment of 
old people, women and children shall be prohibited (Art. 49),
42 See Lu, Y. S. (ed.): The English–Chinese Dictionary (Unabridged) in 2 vols. Vol. I. Shanghai, 
1991, 1571, 2. column, entry 8.
43 In Chinese: jihua shengyu literally means “planned birth”.
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í PRC shall protect the lawful rights and interests of Chinese citizens residing abroad 
and of the family members of Chinese citizens residing abroad as well as the lawful rights 
and interests of overseas Chinese returning home (Art. 50),
í Upon the exercise of their freedoms and rights, the citizens of PRC may not infringe 
the interests of the state, society, the collective or the lawful freedoms and rights of other 
citizens (Art. 51),
í Safeguarding the unity of the country and of all its ethnic groups (Art. 52),
í The citizens of the PRC shall abide by the Constitution and separate law, they shall 
keep state secrets, protect public property, they shall observe labour discipline and public 
order as well as respect social morals (Art. 53),
í Defence of the motherland and doing military service (Art. 55),
í Paying taxes (Art. 56).
Numerically, 19 rights are juxtaposed with 14 obligations, so that work and education 
simultaneously constitute rights and obligations. We could meticulously expand on the 
speci¿ c rights and obligations; instead, we will call the readers’ attention to technical 
literature on Chinese human rights.44 We cannot fail to mention that the constitutional 
amendment of 2004 momentously transformed the Chinese catalogue of human rights. 
Nevertheless, hardly half a decade has passed; therefore, the evolution of considerable 
judicial practice cannot be expected. Among the criticisms concerning human rights in 
China, we refer merely to the “problem map” of European Parliament of 2006: it reproaches 
China with the high number of death sentences (with the comment that all cases in which a 
death sentence has been imposed in the lower instance are automatically submitted for 
review to the People’s High Court of Justice). The report focuses on politically motivated 
imprisonment and forced labour. Besides the issue of the freedoms of speech and religion, 
the Tibetan issue and trade in organs as well as the camp system of Laodong Gaizao 
(literally “reform through labour”) are objected to.45  
4. The Administrative Reform
Formerly we mentioned that in the article of You, 1979 is indicated as the beginning year of 
administrative reforms. Others argue that the administrative reform commenced in August 
1980 with a speech of Deng Xiaoping,46 whereas, administrative reforms have been 
characteristic in PRC since 1949.47 The division of Chinese administrative reforms into 
different periods is well-known, which is partly factual, partly didactic, therefore, its 
publication cannot be neglected. The following periods of public administrative reforms are 
44 Lin: op. cit. 265–284 (Points 10.32–10.76); Biddulph, S.: Legal Reform and Administrative 
Detention Powers in China. Cambridge, 2007, 143–145. Cambridge Studies in Law and Society; 
Saich: op. cit. 266–267.
45 See the following source concerning the human rights report of the European Parliament of 
2006: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=IMPRESS&reference=20070426IPR059
64&language=HU (last visited: 20 December 2009).
46 Burns, J. P.: The Civil Service System of China: The Impact of the Environment. In: Burns, J. 
P.–Bowornwathana, B. (eds): Civil Service Systems in Asia. Cheltenham (UK)–Northampton (USA), 
2001, 103.
47 See the following German technical literature concerning public administration before 1978–
1979 in Su–Tomson: op. cit. 37–69, 114–155, 156–197.
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differentiated: the reform of 1982 (1982–1988); the reform of 1988 (1988–93); the reform 
of 1993 (1993–1998) and the reforms ever since 1998.
4.1. The Reform of 198248 
This is considered to be the ¿ rst reform of greater scale entailed by the “Reform and 
Openness” policy. At that time, the relations between the central administration and local 
governance,49 the aging of civil servants and life-long assignments (mainly due to the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution) and the over-dimensioned government were all deemed 
problematic. Within the framework of the reform, the following steps were taken: the 
economic administration was decentralised and as for the personnel of civil service, both 
the number of the staff and the respective earmarked budget were decreased. Simultaneously, 
the “Four Goals” (in Chinese: Si Hua) were introduced, which summarised the desirable 
qualities of cadres (in Chinese: ganbu) such as revolutionary, young, educated and 
competent. The State Council, scilicet, Chinese Government, which had been outnumbered 
only by the Soviet Union as to its personnel, could record a considerable decrease in the 
number of background institutions and its personnel. Out of the 100 background institutions 
and agencies, 61 persisted in the 1980s and the personnel decreased by one-third.50 After 
1984, the majority of reforms focused on the local level in rural China. In 1987, Deng 
announced the introduction of the merit-based-system of civil service.51 
4.2. The Reform of 1988
The reform of the State Council continued after 1988. The number of departments decreased 
from 45 to 41 and as for background institutions, they decreased from 22 to 19, whereas, 
the personnel of the State Council diminished by a further 19.2%. The reforms could not be 
implemented in local governments at the local level at such a scale as it had been planned. 
The demolition of the traditional planned economy also commenced separately in the scope 
of municipal reforms and rural reforms, however, the implementation of municipal reforms 
proved to be more complex.52 By 1988, the number of the personnel of the State Council 
decreased to 29,600.53   
48 The processes are elucidated chronologically: Tang, T.: China’s Administrative Systems 
Reforms and Trends in their Development. In: Gordon, M. T.–Meininger, M.-C.–Chen, W. (eds): 
Windows on China. Amsterdam–Berlin–Oxford–Tokyo–Washington DC, 2004, X–XII.
49 On Chinese local governments see Xiong, Y.: Rede¿ ning the Role of Local Governments. In: 
Gordon, M. T.–Meininger, M.-C.–Chen, W. (eds): Windows on China. Amsterdam–Berlin–Oxford–
Tokyo–Washington DC, 2004, 127–133.
50 Concerning the reform of the State Council see Xiong: op. cit. X; You: op. cit. 138; Koi, Gy: 
A kínai közigazgatási reform egyes kérdései (Speci¿ c Issues of the Administrative Reforms in China). 
Állam- és Jogtudomány, 47 (2006) 3, 504, The number of the personnel of the State Council decreased 
from 51,000 to 39,000. At the end of 1984, the number of deputy ministers decreased from 13 to 4 per 
department. The number of departments decreased from 52 to 43. (According to other sources, the 
exact number is 45. See the facts about the reform of 1988 in the body text.)
51 Koi: A kínai közigazgatási reform… op. cit. 505.
52 Xiong: op. cit. X–XI.
53 Koi: A kínai közigazgatási reform… op. cit. 504.
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4.3. The Reform of 1993
At that stage, the development of socialist market economy was more accentuated, therefore, 
an important slogan was “the separation of government and enterprises”. Macro-economic 
control and the supervision of associations were increased, whereas, the entitlements of 
government to direct corporate management were reduced. The number of the general 
of¿ ces of the State Council was decreased from 42 to 1(!). Out of 19 background institutions, 
13 were maintained, while the number of government agencies decreased from 9 to 5.54 By 
1993, the regime of cadres was replaced by the system of civil service, cadres converted 
into public servants (in Chinese: gongwuyuan), thenceforth, public administration was not 
based on sheer direct party loyalty.55  
4.4. Reforms since 1998
By the time of the Ninth Five-Year Plan, the reforms had reached a new stage, therefore, 
new problems started to emerge. The reform of the economic system required the further 
reform of government functions and the further decrease of the number of background 
institutions. Since 1998, the essential content of the reforms can be summarised as follows: 
the importance of macro-economic control, direction of the society and the provision of 
public services is sustained. Simpli¿ cation, uni¿ cation and the principle of effectiveness are 
fundamental in Chinese public administration and the insistence on the efforts of the 
numerical decrease of government is characteristic. The distinct allocation of the functions 
among organisations is encouraged. The legal foundation of the system of public 
administration should be reinforced.56 Due to the reforms of 1998, the personnel of the 
State Council were downsized to 16,700 (we should bear in mind that upon its establishment, 
the personnel numbered 51,000 people, thus, two thirds of that has been cut down.)57      
4.5. The Personnel of Chinese Public Administration in ¿ gures
The apparatus of 8 million around 1958 swelled to 18 million by the 1980s. According to 
certain sources, this stratum numbers 35 million people today, which amounts to 2.5% of 
the total population as opposed to the world average of about 1%. According to the data of 
1996, within that stratum 6,285,000 are leaders (from team leaders to ministers), which 
amounts to 18% of the total personnel and the number of women is merely 1 million. (In 
Chinese public administration, the proportion of men is 70% as opposed to the proportion 
of women of 30%.)
We can conclude that the issue of the number of the personnel will impose numerous 
tasks on PRC in the future, as well.58 Undoubtedly, the instruments of public administrative 
law (in Chinese: xingzhengfa) need to be applied to solve the persistent problems. 
54 Xiong: op. cit. XI.
55 Koi: A kínai közigazgatási reform… op. cit. 505. Concerning the Chinese equivalent see Koi: 
A kínai közigazgatási reform… op. cit. 503. On the Reform of 1993 see Gǀnggòng gu΁nl΃ y· zhǀngguó 
xíngzhèng g΁igé. Public Administration and Administrative Reforms in China (Bilingual Monography). 
[s.l.] [s.a.] 49–93.
56 Xiong: op. cit. XI–XII.
57 Koi: A kínai közigazgatási reform… op. cit. 495–509, 505. Concerning the Chinese equivalent, 
see Koi: A kínai közigazgatási reform… op. cit. 504.
58 Concerning Chinese civil service more amply, see Koi: A kínai közigazgatási reform… op. 
cit. 500–507.
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5. The Reform of Civil Law
The majority of traditional Chinese law constitutes criminal law, whereas, the minor part is 
public administrative law. Within this framework, civil law hardly has a role.59 In this part, 
we will examine the creation of the Chinese Civil Code thus, family law, commercial or 
labour law will be not subject to a detailed examination.60  
Drafting the ¿ rst Chinese Civil Code commenced in 1906, when with the involvement 
of Japanese legal experts, the Qing-dynasty of Manchurian origin launched the compilation 
of a new criminal code, the ¿ rst Civil Code and commercial code. The draft was prepared 
by 1911. The Chinese Civil Code was taking effect gradually between 1929 and 1931.61 
Before its entry into effect, three parts of the draft had been compiled by 1911, two parts by 
1916 and they are known as the Private Law Draft of the Qing-dynasty.62 Subsequently to 
the entries into effect in 1929 and 1931, the law can be regarded as being in full effect only 
as of 1936.63 Its text was published in English64 and in Latin, as well.65 This Chinese Civil 
Code has persisted only in Taiwan.66 Concerning that Civil Code, Jordán comments that it 
was based on the Swiss Civil Code,67 whereas, Hamza points out the impact of the Japanese 
Civil Code, the German BGB, the Swiss Civil Code (ZGB), the Swiss contract code (OR), 
the Siamese Civil Code, the Soviet-Russian Civil Code and of the Turkish Civil Code. 
Eventually, the law follows the Swiss model of the code unique.68 This Civil Code of 1936 
59 Concerning Chinese traditional law and Chinese private law effective 3–4 decades ago, see 
the following main works on comparative law in Hungarian or translated into Hungarian on advice: 
David, R.: A kínai jog. In: David, R.: A jelenkor nagy jogrendszerei. Összehasonlító jog (Law in 
China. Contemporary Great Legal Systems. Comparative Law). From Les grands systèmes de droit 
contemporains transleted by Nagy Lajosné Dusa Margit. Budapest, 422–433; Hamza, G.: Kína 
(A Kínai Népköztársaság és Tajvan) (China. The People’s Republic of China and Taiwan). In: Hamza, 
G.: Az európai magánjog fejlĘdése. A modern magánjogi rendszerek kialakulása a római jogi 
hagyományok alapján (Trends in the Development of Private Law in Europe. The Role of the Civilian 
Tradition in the shaping of Modern Systems of Private Law). Budapest, 2002, 301–303. With reference 
to Chinese civil law and the Civil Code, see Jordán: „Az ég magas…” op. cit. 6, 27, 31, 32, 53–54, 
107, 224–225, 234. A study on the method of comparative law see Péteri, Z.: Goals and Methods of 
Legal Comparison. In: Péteri, Z. (ed.): The Comparison of Law. La comparaison de droit. Selected 
Essays for the 9th International Congress on Comparative Law. Essais choisis pour le 9e Congrès 
International de droit comparé. Budapest, 1974, 45–58.
60 On Chinese family law (and the law of marriage therein separately) in detail see Jordán: „Az 
ég magas…” op. cit. 213–240.
61 Hamza: op. cit. 302.
62 Koi, Gy.: Francia monográ¿ a a modern kínai magánjogról (A French Monograph on Modern 
Chinese Private Law) [Piquet, Hélène: La Chine au carrefour des traditions juridiques. Bruxelles, 
2005, 332.]. Acta Facultatis Politico–Iuridicae Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando 
Eötvös Nominatae, 44 (2007), 233–242, in detail see 237.
63 Piquet, H.: La Chine au carrefour des traditions juridiques. Bruxelles, 2005,118.
64 See the English-language version: The Civil Code of the Republic of China I–V. Shanghai, 
1931. Quoted in: Hamza: op. cit. 301, footnote 369.
65 See the Latin version: Jarre, C. R.: Codex Juris Civilis Reipublicae Sinicae (translatus in 
linguam latinam). Zhinanfu, 1934. Quoted in: Hamza: op. cit. 301, footnote 369. 
66 Hamza: op. cit. 303; Jordán: „Az ég magas …” op. cit. 31–32; Koi: Francia monográ¿ a a 
modern kínai magánjogról … op. cit. 238.
67 Jordán: „Az ég magas …” op. cit. 32.
68 Hamza: op. cit. 302. 
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was also called Six Codes (Sexapartitum), since it consisted of six parts.69 In 1949, after the 
formation of PRC, a legal problem emerged. It was the Six Codes (it literally means “Six 
Code Completed Books” (in Chinese: liufa; in Japanese: Roppo)70 that contained the most 
important six legal codes of the Republic of China (Taiwan).71 This is not the same as the 
Six (Civil) Codes.72 Since the Government of PRC in its General Program (Art. 17)73 put 
into force a Directive Overruling the Guomindang Six Code Completed Book,74 according 
to which all the repressive laws, decrees and courts of Guomindang shall be withdrawn.75 
Since PRC consequently persisted without a Civil Code, the need for drafting a new one 
emerged urgently. The respective work commenced as early as in 1954.76 Following the 
death of Mao Zedong (1976), four drafts were promulgated between 1979 and 1982, the 
third one was published in 1981, whereas, the fourth one in 1982.77 In 1986, the document 
framed between 1980 and 1986 designated as “General Principles of the Civil Law of the 
People’s Republic of China” consisting of 9 Chapters and 156 Articles,78 was adopted in 
1986 and promulgated as a decree in 1987.79 In December 2002, an important step forward 
was made, scilicet, the draft of the Civil Code was adopted by legislation, the People’s 
National Assembly. This draft is 216 pages long and consists of 1209 sections. It includes 




– Human Dignity and Civil Rights,
– Marriage,
– Adoption,
– Law Pertaining to Inheritance,
– The Order of Civil Law Liability,
– International Private Law.80
69 Piquet: op. cit. 122.
70 The six Japanese Codes are as follows: The Civil Code (in Japanese: Minpo), The Commercial 
Code (in Japanese: Shoho), The Penal Code (in Japanese: Keiho), The Constitution of Japan (in 
Japanese: Nippon-koku-kenpo), the Code of the Criminal Procedure (in Japanese: Keiji-sosho-ho), 
The Code of the Civil Procedure (in Japanese: Minji sosho-ho).
71 The Six Codes of the Republic of China (Taiwan) are: The Constitution of Republic of China 
(in Chinese: Xianfa), The Civil Code (in Chinese: Minfa), The Code of the Civil Procedure (in 
Chinese: Minshi susong fa), The Penal Code (in Chinese: Xingfa), The Code of the Criminal Procedure 
(in Chinese: Xingshi susong fa), Administrative Laws (in Chinese: Xingzhengfa).
72 Jordán: Kína története. op. cit. 53–54.
73 “All laws, regulations and courts of the Guomindang which oppressed the people shall be 
overruled.”
74 Jordán: Kína története. op. cit. 53.
75 Jordán: „Az ég magas …” op. cit. 53.
76 Koi: Francia monográ¿ a a modern kínai magánjogról… op. cit. 239, footnote 21.
77 Hamza: op. cit. 303, footnote 371.
78 Hamza: op. cit. 303; Földi, A.–Hamza, G.: A római jog története és instituciói (History and 
the Institutions of Roman Law). Budapest, 12th ed., 2007, 131; Koi: Francia monográ¿ a a modern 
kínai magánjogról … op. cit. 238.
79 Koi: Francia monográ¿ a a modern kínai magánjogról… ibid.
80 Piquet: op. cit. 201.
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We need to draw the attention to the fact that contracts and the tenets of liability are 
dealt with separately in the text on general principles. This is practically due to the impact 
of common law. We can only wish that PRC drafts its Civil Code as soon as possible. 
6. Closing Remarks
As an outset of this study, we stated that the evolution of Hungarian legal sinology is under 
a heavy handicap with regard to technical literature both written in Hungarian and translated 
into Hungarian in comparison for example with historical sinology. Therefore, a compendium 
with a legal viewpoint concerning the ongoing Chinese reforms for the recent 30 years with 
special respect to the People’s Republic of China prevailing for 60 years would be urgently 
necessary. Historians and economists (especially those interested in world economy) have 
specialised in China both at the level of education and research rather than legal scientists 
À outing processes. This discipline demonstrated some interest in China substantiated by 
technical literature merely in the 1950s, however, this hardly overreached the scope of 
descriptive booklets translated from Russian. By this day, however, the People’s Republic 
of China is an unevadable world power, a macro-economic factor and if you please, a factor 
determining international law. After yielding to the conception of class struggle following 
Mao’s death, the reforms beginning 30 years ago linked up the Maoist state with the 
elements of social market economy, promoting thereby the ful¿ lment of the inherent nature 
of the Chinese peasant population, the majority of whom were born for trading. Our work 
has elucidated that the outset of the reforms as it was spontaneous cannot be attached either 
to 1978 or to 1979, therefore, it was not sparked off either by the secret product surplus 
appropriating movement or the CCP legitimating such organisations posteriorly, which 
considered the commencement of the reforms subsequently as a fact. The years of 1978–79 
can be deemed as continuous commencement of the reform, in which the crucial role was 
played by the victory of Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatist policy in 1978. This can be construed 
exclusively in the light of the death of Mao in 1976, who appointed his successor to be the 
orthodox Marxist Hua Guofeng supporting the Cultural Revolution. Considering the legal 
policy of the reforms, we examined three areas after an analysis of the historical roots, 
scilicet, the constitutional reform, the reform of public administration and of civil law. As a 
result of the reform of constitutional law, the 4th Constitution of PRC (9th Constitution of 
the state of China) took effect in 1982 during the reforms. It was amended 4 times in 1988, 
1993, 1999 and 2004. In the scope of major policies, we need to highlight that socialist 
market economy has replaced the system of planned economy, as a result, the protection of 
private property, the effectuation of compensation for expropriation constitute the most 
essential changes of principle. It was a genuine Copernican turning point in constitutional 
law that Para. (1) of Art. 33 of the Constitution of PRC in 2004 provided that the state shall 
protect and respect human rights. We dealt with the reform of public administration in its 
temporality. Accordingly, 1982, 1988, 1993 and 1998 can be considered the dividing years 
of the reform, when the number of the staff of Chinese Government, i.e. the State Council 
implementing services and of¿ cial functions as well as the number of politicians was 
massively reduced. The apparatus of the State Council formerly numbering 51,000 members 
decreased to 16,700 in 16 years (by 66%). The reforms considerably affected local 
governance, although the respective ¿ gures are less known. Notwithstanding, public 
administration can still be considered overstaffed. 
The reforms of civil law are also signi¿ cant, the objective of which was drafting new 
codices after the voidance of the bourgeois laws of the Guomindang. The work commenced 
in 1954, but the ¿ rst four drafts were promulgated as late as between 1979 and 1982, 
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scilicet, during the period of the reforms. The document designated as the General Principles 
of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China was framed between 1980 and 1986, it 
took effect in 1987 and has been functioning practically as a decree. The draft of the Chinese 
Civil Code was publicised in 2004. The reforms are bound to continue in the future, as well. 
However, the current Maoist political trend is unlikely to come to an end. Notwithstanding, 
the signs of democratisation are manifest in the territory of PRC, as well.    
 
 
